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NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES-
THE ANSWER OR THE PROBLEM FOR THE
LEGAL PROFESSION?
By
CLARA ANN BOWLER*
THE CONCEPT OF a federally financed national legal services pro-
gram for the poor is relatively new and experimental. Since being put
into practice through the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO),
it has attracted the attention of politicians, lawyers and the general
public by its innovative approaches to the poor and their problems. It
has also provided access to lawyers and legal services for thousands
of people who hitherto had been forced to do without for lack of the
resources to pay a lawyer's fee. At the same time, the national legal
services program has found many enemies in persons who, justifiably
or not, feel threatened by both its litigation and its services to the
poor. In an effort to protect the program from its enemies, the or-
ganized legal profession has proposed a so-called National Legal Ser-
vices Corporation to insulate the national legal services program from
the storms of political controversy. The National Legal Services Cor-
poration proposal, in turn, has been captured by opponents of na-
tional legal services as a means for altering or eliminating them.
This article is an attempt to trace the history and controversies
of the OEO legal services program and the proposed National Legal
Services Corporation. In addition to narrating -the course of events,
it examines the problems which the OEO program has raised for the
legal profession and the difficulties the Corporation model has met in
attempting to answer them. Finally, it suggests that the national
legal services concept itself has been a part of the problems it raised
and that these problems may very well spill over beyond the bounds
* B.A., University of Chicago; M.A.T., University of Chicago; I.D., DePaul
University. Member, Illinois Bar. Research Assistant for Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics.
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of legal services for the poor and the existance of a national program
to perform these services.
OEO LEGAL SERVICES
The national legal services program began as a special project of
the Community Action program established by the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act of 1964.1 Although supported by the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) as a federally funded traditional legal aid project,'
the legal services program in practice patterned itself after such pri-
vately funded experimental projects as Mobilization for Youth (MYF)
in New York City3 in line with the concept of the neighborhood law
office outlined by Edgar S. and Jean C. Cahn.4 Because the official
goals of the program were vague or unarticulated,5 the actual operation
of legal services programs varied greatly depending upon local con-
ditions and the outlook of the local grantee.' However, it is not un-
fair to characterize the OEO legal services program as a successful
attempt to channel legal advocacy into -the War on Poverty of the
1960's.
The Cahns and the more liberal promoters of national legal serv-
ices viewed the neighborhood law office as a unique opportunity to
activate fully the traditional advocacy skills of ,the legal profession
which had hitherto been only sporadically exercised on behalf of the
poverty-stricken.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2809 (a)(3) (1967); Note, The Legal Services Corporation: Cur-
tailing Political Interference, 81 YALE L.J. 231 (1971).
2. Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 699, 701
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Social Justice].
3. James, The People's Lawyers 44 (1973); Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The
New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARv. L. REV. 805 (1967).
4. Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Civilian Perspective]. The Calms' proposals were latet
elaborated in CARLIN, HoWARD & MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE PooR (1967).
See also Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited,
41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 927 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Civilian Perspective Re-
visited]; Finman, OEO Legal Services Programs and the Pursuit of Social Change,
1971 Wisc. L. REV. 1001 (1971); Frankel, Experiments in Serving the Indigent, 51
A.B.A.J. 460 (1965); Hazard, Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. Cm.
L. REv. 242 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Law Reforming]; Hazard, Social Justice, supra
note 2; Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Anti-Poverty Program, 31 LAw & COM-
TEMP. PROB. 211 (1966); Sullivan, Law Reform and the Legal Services Crisis, 59
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1971); Note, supra note 1; Note, supra note 3.
5. 42 USC § 2809 (a)(3)(1967); Pye, supra note 4.
6. See generally, Carlin, supra note 4. The OEO program was organized for the
purpose of funding and supervising projects carried out on the local level by various
institutional and individual grantees. Despite guidelines for operation and formal re-
quirements governing federal funding, the day-to-day activities of each project are
principally determined by the local promoters on behalf of the grantee. See Finman,
supra note 4.
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The lawyer's most significant asset, however, is the unique advo-
cacy orientation of his profession-one to which our legal system
and the canons of legal ethics commit him. Other profes-
sionals. . . are institutionally given the role of mediating between
their employers and the clients. A lawyer need not be apologetic
for being partisan, for identifying. That is his function. 7
They saw the law as a means of balancing the power held by the non-
poor in the form of economic wealth, social status and political or-
ganization." This balance was to be achieved by lawyers on behalf
of the poor who would raise their clearly defined but often unasserted
rights, provide legal analysis for the purpose of law reform where the
law was vague, uncertain, destructively complex or contrary to their
interests, and even represent them in contexts which appeared to be
non-legal.9 In short, access to the law by means of a professional legal
advocate was seen as the solution to the ageless problem of poverty.
The fact that certain attributes of the traditional legal profession
might hinder lawyers in their advocacy for the poor was not entirely
lost on the neighborhood law office enthusiasts.1" However, some of
their early fears turned out to be misplaced. For example, a compre-
hensive Note in the Harvard Law Review speculated that the new legal
services program would quickly run into difficulty with the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the ABA.1" Canons No. 35 and 47, in partic-
ular, prohibited the use of non-lawyers "intermediaries" (OEO gran-
tees?) to promote the professional services of a lawyer unless the agency
could qualify as a "charitable society rendering aid to indigents"1 2
in the traditional legal aid society manner. But as early as 1963,
the U. S. Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Button 8 that the State
of Virginia could not prohibit the NAACP from referring members
to civil rights attorneys under the guise of violating a Virginia statute
prohibiting the improper solicitation of legal business and Canons 35
and 47 as adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.14  The
Supreme Court argued that the NAACP's activities in encouraging
civil rights litigation constituted:
modes of expression and association protected by the First and
7. Civilian Perspective, supra note 4, at 1335.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1340-45; Carlin, supra note 4, at 52-53.
10. See generally, Civilian Perspective, supra note 4; Civilian Perspective Revisited,
supra note 4; Pye, supra note 4; Note, supra note 3.
11. Note, supra note 3, at 836-39.
12. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETifcs No. 35; see discussion in CRISTENSEN,
LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 230, n. 13 and 256-84 (1970).
13. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
14. Id.
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Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under
its power to regulate the legal profession .... 15
Button was followed by Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. State Bar6
which extended the mantle of protected activities to Union sponsored
lawyer referral programs designed to assist Union members in collect-
ing damage claims against their employers. United Mine Workers v.
Ill. Bar Ass'n17 further expanded Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen to include the
retaining of a salaried attorney by the union to handle the individual
cases of its members.
These decisions had three long-term effects on the future of legal
services for the poor. First, they enabled OEO legal services programs
to defend themselves against charges of violating ethical prohibi-
tions against the solicitation of legal business, the use of non-lawyer
"intermediaries" to promote legal business and the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. i" Second, they opened the door to experiments in
pre-paid legal services or insurance plans operated by unions and
other organizations for the benefit of their members.'" Most im-
portant for the national legal services program, they led the ABA in
1969 to discard the old Canon of Professional Ethics and draft a Code
of Professional Responsibility which provided an extensive description
of approved legal services activities2" as well as special rules for lawyers
engaged in such programs.2'
Some proponents of the neighborhood law office saw the support
of the ABA and the organized bar as a threat to attempts of the na-
tional legal services program to break away from the limitations of
old-fashioned legal aid with its emphasis on settling problems on an
individual basis through negotiation and mediation rather than through
aggressive advocacy and litigation.22 Others were conceraned that the
initial enthusiasm of "young and dynamic lawyers of high quality"
would die out leaving the program without the psychological impetus
15. Id. at 428-29.
16. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). But see Id. at 10, Clark, I. (dissent): "Personal injury
litigation is not a form of political expression, but rather a procedure for the settle-
ment of damage claims. No guaranteed civil right is involved."
17. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
18. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Nos. 27, 35 and 47.
19. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, FORMAL OPINIONs Nos. 332 and 333
(1973). See generally ABA Sp. COMM. ON PREPAID LEcAL SERVICES, REVISED HANDBOOK
ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES (2d ed. 1972).
20. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmrLITY, CANON No. 2, Disciplinary Rule
2-103 (D).
21. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, OPINION No. 324 (1970); ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, Preface at vii (Final Draft, July 1, 1969).
22. See, e.g., Pye, supra note 4; Note, supra note 3.
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necessary to conquer poverty.2" More sociologically oriented obser-
vers felt that legal service lawyers would be hampered by the low pres-
tige attached to working with poverty-stricken clients, the inability of
the poor to initiate claims as expected by traditional legal ethics, and
the tendency of the legal discipline to focus on the particular case and
controversey rather than the broader social problem. 4 All of these
problems did appear in one form or another, but they soon faded into
insignificance beside the massive political assault on OEO legal serv-
ices 25 set off by unexpected legal services victories against govern-
mental agencies in the courts.2 6
The most highly publicized political attacks came from California
where the California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) successfully
challenged the legality of Governor Regan's cuts in the California medi-
caid program and practices of the U. S. Department of Labor concern-
ing Mexican farm laborers.2 7  In 1967, Senator George Murphy of
California proposed an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964 which would have directly prohibited OEO legal services gran-
tees from bringing suits against any governmental agencies-federal,
state or local. The amendment was defeated in the Senate.2" Two
years later, Senator Murphy tried a more circuitous approach in the
form of an amendment which would have given state governors an
absolute veto over any OEO funded legal services project within their
state.29  The second Murphy Amendment narrowly passed the Senate"
but was killed in a conference committee, mainly because of strong
opposition from the ABA."'
The following year another assault on the national legal services
program was made, this time by means of administrative reorganiza-
tion rather than Congressional action. OEO Director Donald Rums-
feld proposed to decentralize the OEO program by placing the opera-
tion of legal services under the jurisdiction of general OEO regional
directors rather than the legal services director in Washington. Legal
23. Note, supra note 3, at 825.
24. Carlin, supra note 4, at 56-58.
25. Arnold, Whither Legal Services, JuRis DOCTOR, Feb., 1971, at 3; Robb, Con-
troversial Cases and the Legal Service Program, 56 A.B.A.J. 329 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968).
27. James, supra note 3, at 49-50; Robb, supra note 25.
28. 113 CONG. REC. S. 27873 (Oct. 4, 1967); Robb, supra note 25.
29. 115 CONG. REC. S. 29894 (Oct. 14, 1969); Robb, supra note 25. State
governors do have a qualified veto over OEO projects under 42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1972)
but can be overridden by the OEO Director. Note, supra note 1, at 238.
30. 115 CONG. REC. S. 29897 (Oct. 14, 1969).
31. Robb, supra note 25; Sullivan, supr6 note 4, at 25, n. 82.
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services supporters protested against the so-called "regionalization"
plan because of the increased opportunity for local politicians to pres-
sure regional directors into stopping law reform activities and the "un-
ethical" subordination of legal services attorneys to non-lawyer regional
directors.3 2 The controversy culminated in the issuance of a complex
set of regionalization guidelines on November 14, 1970, the firing of
the director of the legal services program for insubordination on No-
vember 21, a noisy protest from the legal services bloc, and the quiet
rescinding of the guidelines in early December.33  As in the Murphy
controversies, legal services people invoked the support of traditional
legal ethics and the ABA.
Because of the unique and constitutionally privileged status of
legal advocacy, the organized bar insisted from the very beginning
that the program must be under professional direction administered
independently, and in accordance with the highest standards of the
profession.3 4
The ABA responded in two different ways. First, the Committee on
Professional Ethics made an only partially successful attempt to the
clarify the ethical relationship between a legal services attorney and
his employers under the new Code of Professional Responsibility. 5
Second, the ABA and other segments of the organized bar increased
their lobbying efforts in Congress on behalf of the national legal services
program.3 6
By late December of 1970 the anti-legal services action had shifted
back to California where Governor Reagan vetoed an OEO grant of
$1.8 million to CRLA citing a report by Lewis K. Uhler of the Cali-
fornia Office of Economic Opportunity which accused CRLA of repre-
senting accused felons, soliciting clients, encouraging political demon-
strations and counseling the United Farm Workers Organizing Com-
32. Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower and Public Welfare of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 109, 567 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Regionalization Hearings]; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BrLITy, Ethical Considerations 5-24; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETMCS, OPINION
No. 324 (1970).
33. Regionalization Hearings, supra note 32, at 354-545.
34. Testimony of Jean Camper Calm, Regionalization Hearings, supra note 32, at
546, 551-52.
35. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS, OPINION No. 324 (1970). Formal
Opinion No. 324 drew an analogy between the board of directors of a legal aid society
and the senior partners of a law firm and granted the board authority to formulate
"broad goals and policies" for its lawyer employees even though some of the board
members might be laymen. The relationship of the lawyer employees to a parent fund-
ing organization such as OEO was not discussed.
36. Regionalization Hearings, supra note 32, at 140-69.
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mittee in violation of OEO guidelines.87 Rumsfeld's successor as
OEO Director, Frank Carlucci, extended funding to CRLA through
July 1971 and appointed an independent Commission of three non-
California judges to conduct an investigation. The judges vindicated
CRLA and Carlucci renewed their funding, but also funded a $2.5
million experimental Judicare program supposedly in response to Gover-
nor Regan's proposals to bypass CRLA and pay private attorneys to
represent indigent clients on an individual fee basis.88 In early 1971
the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization and the
ABA both proposed to solve all of legal services' political problems
through the establishment of a so-called National Legal Services Cor-
poration. 39  By summer, the Reagan affair had become immersed in
an extensive Congressional investigation which eventually prompted
Congress to attempt to remove the legal services program from OEO
in favor of the proposed National Legal Services Corporation.40
While the political battle raged in Congress and OEO, certain
tendencies began to surface within the ranks of national legal services
attorneys which point toward a disintegration of the legal profession as
it has been traditionally conceived. One of these trends has been the
affiliation of radical or Movement lawyers within the national legal
services program. Although greatly exaggerated by conservative Con-
gressmen, 41 there have been a certain number of poverty lawyers who
were either radicalized by their legal services experience or who rather
naively believed that OEO was underwriting the oncoming social revolu-
tion.42 It may seem to an outside observer that the Marxist orienta-
tion of most Movement lawyers should prescribe bombs and barricades
in the face of the "onrushing terrorist dictatorship" (the Nixon adminis-
37. Economic Opportunity Act, Hearings Before Sp. Subcomms. No. 1 and No. 2
of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1971) [herein-
after cited as CRLA Hearings]; Governor Reagan's veto can be found in Nominations:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on the Nomination of
Frank Carlucci to be Director of OEO, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 28-60 (1970); The Uhler
Report, A Study and Evaluation of California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., is reprinted
id., at 300-582.
38. CRLA Hearings, supra note 37, at 2-28.
39. U.S. President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, Establishment
of a Department of Natural Resources/Organization for Social and Economic Pro-
grams, at 6 (1970); ABA Sect. of Individual Rights & Responsibilities, The Corporation
for Legal Services (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA Proposal].
40. CRLA Hearings, supra note 37; Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower & Poverty of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 4 & 5, at 1457-1524,
1603-2179 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 OEO Hearings].
41. See, e.g., MINOIuTY VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE LANDGREBE, H.R. REP. No.
93-247, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1973).
42. James, supra note 3, at xviii, 43-46.
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tration?), rather than test cases, class actions and group representation.
However, many Movement lawyers seem to believe that the preserva-
tion of middle class democratic liberties is more relevant at this time
in history than more direct revolutionary activities.43 This perspec-
tive enables them to accept bourgeois government subsidization in the
form of legal services grants when they can get them.
A more legitimate offspring of the neighborhood law office is
the group representative modeled on the labor union lawyer. The more
classic union lawyer who confines his activities to group, as opposed
to individual, interests has tended to gravitate into house counsel posi-
tions with the stronger new union groups.44  However, the OEO group
representative has not been able to shake the legal services preoccupa-
tion with individual problems so easily. For the most part he con-
tinues to represent individuals, but restricts his clientele to members
of whatever organization he is currently promoting. Non-members
are forced to join or do without legal services. The theory is that legal
services alone are not sufficient to overcome poverty and the poor need
to organize as other social groups do in order to exert power and in-
fluence to promote social change. However, the OEO legal services
attorney must operate under the political scrutiny of the same forces
who are oppressing the poor and is often too socially alienated from
his clients to engage in the direct organizing of poor people's organiza-
tions. Therefore he circumvents these political and social barriers by
using his monopoly on legal services to the poor to induce membership
in existing favored neighborhood and poor people's organizations. 45
Although this type of activity has not gone without criticism,4" it is
noteworthy that a program designed to improve the lot of the poor by
increasing the availability of legal services and expanding access to the
43. "[Iln this period in our history the effective development of a massive defense
of the elementary forms of democratic liberties led by radicals is not antithetical to,
but in fact accelerates, the radicalization of the millions who are daily being thrown
into motion by the attacks and blunders of the governing circles." Kinoy, The Role of
the Radical Lawyer and Teacher of Law, 29 GUILD PRACTITIONER 3, 18 (1970). There
is, of course, nothing new about socialist lawyers. The National Lawyer's Guild has
been in operation since 1937. James, supra note 3, at xiv-xvi.
44. See, e.g., James, supra note 3, at 324-36.
45. Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 at 1053 (1970).
46. "The neighborhood lawyer must guard against devoting large amounts of time
to organizations whose intangible benefits accrue only to a small number of leaders
whose ambitions need no encouragement. He must also be wary of putting himself into
a relationship with a local organization which jeopardizes his general usefulness in the
neighborhood. This problem becomes particularly acute when neighborhood organiza-
tions conflict with each other." Note, supra note 3, at 820. See also Law Reforming,
supra note 3, at 255.
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law4 7 is exploiting the -traditional scarcity of legal services as a strategic
weapon in its general struggle to overcome poverty.
In short, one can view the traditional structure of the legal profes-
sion as an attempt to preserve a monopoly over access to the law, there-
by creating an artificial scarcity of legal services which inheres to the
financial benefit of members of the legal profession.4 8 From this view-
point, national legal services represents a disintegration of the tradi-
tional legal profession in that it greatly expands the availability of legal
services and increases access to the courts as enforcing mechanisms
of the law.40  If this disintegration is the proper means of insuring jus-
tice for the greatest number of people, 50 how can one justify the ex-
ploitation of the traditional monopoly of the legal profession as a strate-
gic weapon in the same struggle to break down the monopoly? Or is
the relationship between access to the law and justice for the poor more
complicated than the neighborhood law office enthusiasts have presented
it?
A side effect of the legal services group representative theory is
a total breakdown in the classic attorney client relationship. A clear
description of this development can be found in an article by Stephen
Wexler.5 Wexler maintains that
[t]wo major touchstones of traditional legal practice-the solving
of legal problems and the one-to-one client relationship between
attorney and client-are either not relevant to poor people or harm-
ful to them.5 2
In addition to withholding legal services and sometimes common de-
cency53 in order to promote poverty organizations, Wexler stresses the
47. Civilian Perspective, supra note 3; President's Statement, 7 Wkly. Comp. Pres.
Doc. 726 (May 5, 1971); Statement of ABA President, Chesterfield Smith, 50 A.B.A.J.
921 (1973).
48. Civilian Perspective Revisited, supra note 3, at 936; Cahn & Calm, Power to
the People or the Profession?, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Power to
the People]; Christensen, supra note 12, at 26-29. The reader should be cautioned that
even though this theory has been echoed in studies sanctioned by the American Bar
Foundation (a legal research wing of the ABA), it is considered by the profession to
be heretical. The more generally accepted theory justifies the traditional structure of
the profession as necessary to insure the provision of high quality legal services to the
general public.
49. See Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S.
923, rehearing denied 397 U.S. 1018.
50. Civilian Perspective, supra note 3. But see, Hazard, Social Justice, supra
note 2. Hazard believes that civil and social justice are, by definition, contradictory.
51. Wexler, supra note 45.
52. Id. at 1050. Compare, Civilian Perspective, supra note 3, at 1345: "Legal
theories are, in short, a form of discourse which can on occasion have a force equivalent
to that which inheres in organization, status or wealth."
53. Wexler, supra note 45, at 1054. Wexler writes of an anecdote about the
lawyer who refused to advise one of his lay organizers about her son's mental disability
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absolute necessity of allowing poverty clients to dictate the poverty
lawyer's strategies even though the lawyer may not approve of the
method chosen54 or consider it to be the most effective utilization of
his legal skills.55 Although the Wexler strategy answers the charge
that legal services law reform activity is merely
an attempt to create a role for middle-class professionals in which
they can aid the cause of the poor without losing their professional
status or otherwise getting their hands dirty,5 6
it is sometimes difficult to see why Wexler's poor people's lawyer
should be a lawyer at all. Certainly lay organizers can be bought
cheaper.
Both Movement lawyers and group representatives in the national
legal services are open to the criticism that they are wasting the expen-
sive and scarce services of traditionally trained lawyers in activities
that could be performed just as well, if not better, by non-lawyers
trained in the fine art of political organizing. However, even the more
traditional service functions of the legal services program are creating
problems of rising expectations which may ultimately cause an even
broader disintegration of the traditional legal profession and possibly
the entire Anglo-American system of justice. The problem is twofold.
First, individuals who previously handled their legal problems as best
they could without the aid of lawyers have suddenly discovered the
availability and value of the legal services attorney and increased their
demand for his services. This has created a spiralling resource dilemma
in which each increase in the supply of lawyers to the poor raises the
demand for their services.5 7  Second, the law reform activities of legal
services lawyers and privately funded civil rights attorneys have set off
a chain of test cases and class actions" (not to mention "public interest"
for fear she would stop her organizing work and spend more time seeking help for her
own child.
54. For example, a physical assault on a physician at a hospital. See id. at 1064-
65.
55. "I ignored the real problems of the recipients . . . in favor of problems which
I was disposed to see, on which I could better exercise my skills .... "Id. at 1066.
56. Law Reforming, supra note 3, at 255.
57. "We have, then, an inefficient system for dispensing an unsatisfactory product
which is kept in unnecessarily short supply by a monopoly-created scarcity of man-
power . . . . And we, the producer, in pushing for an expansion of traditional legal
services, are thus engaged in a sales pitch for a product that we can't offer within the
price of the market it must reach to do any good." Civilian Perspective Revisited, supra
note 3, at 936.
58. See 58 FRD 299 (1973) for a discussion of class actions; but see recent limita-
tions on class actions in Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973) (jurisdictional
amount requirement); and O'Shea v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974) (case or contro-
versy requirement).
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suits) for the purpose of substituting litigation for legislation.5" On
the client level this litigation has resulted in what the Cahns refer to
as the "Rights Explosion" and the "Grievance Explosion"60 in which
each new civil right leads to ten other proposed "rights" and each wrong
righted by the courts creates a hundred new complaints. All of this
is compounded by the internal struggle between the individual services
attorneys and the law reform attorneys for a greater share of the federal
money bag.6 '
There are presently three different approaches to this problem.
The first solution comes from the Cahns who helped create the prob-
lem by proposing the nation-wide establishment of neighborhood legal
services offices. Their solution is the creation of a new institution in
the form of a neighborhood corporation z designed by lawyers but
operated by laymen. The structure of this neighborhood corporation
is somewhat vague, but it is clearly meant to encompass judicial tri-
bunals with the power to monitor and enforce sanctions against public
offficials as well as a corporate structure to service the individual and
group needs of the neighborhood poor. 63
Another approach can be seen in the criticisms of the legal
services position made by Geoffrey Hazard." Hazard believes that
poverty is basically a problem of the allocation of economic resources
which can only be solved by the redistribution of property. Although
legal action can occasionally alleviate problems in individual cases, it
can never effect any meaningful redistribution of property within
American society. In fact, the essence of Anglo-American civil law
and justice is the enforcement of established property claims, an ac-
tivity which by definition is antithetical to the redistribution of prop-
erty in favor of the needy.65 On the law reform front, Hazard criti-
cizes judicial decisions in test cases and class actions as an ineffective
and expensive means of legislative action which could be more effec-
tively carried out by traditional democratic political processes.66 In
59. Law Reforming, supra note 3.
60. Power to the People, supra note 48, at 1008-10.
61. Not all individual service proponents are traditional legal aid society sup-
porters. See, e.g., James, supra note 3, at 60-61, for some dissent in the ranks of
CRLA. See also Wexler, supra note 45, at 1049-50, for a discussion of the limitations
on the value of test case litigation to the test case client.
62. Not to be confused with the proposed National Legal Services Corporation for
funding local legal services projects.
63. Civilian Perspective Revisited, supra note 3; Power to the People, supra note
48.
64. Social Justice, supra note 3; Law Reforming, supra note 3.
65. Social Justice, supra note 3, at 708.
66. Law Reforming, supra note 3, at 250.
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short, there is no need for new institutions to obtain legal solutions
for the special economic and social problems of the poor. The prob-
lem for the poor is obtaining power within the existing social and
political institutions through leaders of their own choice, using the same
rough and ready methods that everyone else does. 7
The third approach is that adopted by the ABA, which tends to
ignore the disruptive potential of the "Rights" and the "Grievance
Explosion" and treats the spiralling demand for Iawyers as a "delivery
of services" problem. 68  A good example of this approach is Barlow F.
Christensen who started with the massive demand for free legal services
on the part of the poor and discovered that many people above the
poverty line also had a need for legal services which was not being met. 9
He then proposed increasing the availability of lawyers to lower middle
class people through both lowering the cost of producing legal serv-
ices by means of increased law office efficiency, specialization 'and the
use of paraprofessionals; and increasing access to the lawyers through
relaxed ethical bans on advertising, through lawyer referral services
and through group legal services.70 Underlying this approach is an
attempt to absorb the disintegrating effects of the increased demand for
legal services with minimal changes in the internal structure of the pro-
fession. In other words the traditional law firm remains (with com-
puters, new office management techniques, specialization and parapro-
fessionals), but new mechanisms are established to ascertain who needs
their services and to distribute the services accordingly.
One of Christensen's (and the ABA's) proposals that is spilling
back into legal services for the poor is group legal services-or the
delivery of legal services through a lay organization either as a fringe
or primary benefit of membership. 71  In group legal service plans the
purpose of the group is to provide access to the lawyer and/or money to
pay for his services, and should be distinguished from national legal serv-
ices group representation where access to "free" legal services are
artificially restricted in order to encourage or coerce member-
ship in a particular group. Christensen's selling point to the organized
67. Law Reforming, supra note 3, at 255. See James, supra note 3, at 238-39,
244-45 for a radical critique of Northern inspired civil rights litigation and judicial leg-
islation in the South.
68. Statement of ABA President Chesterfield Smith, 59 A.B.A.J. 921 (1973); see
generally Christensen, supra note 12. There are also signs that this approach is con-
tinuing to infiltrate Congress. 59 A.B.A.J. 1175 (1973).
69. Christensen, supra note 12, at 22-26; see also F. MARxs, THE LAWYER, THE
PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972).
70. Christensen, supra note 12, at 44-56.
71. Id.
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bar is that Supreme Court decisions attacking the old prohibition in the
Canons of Professional Ethics against the use of lay intermediaries to
promote the services of lawyers72 should be accepted by the profession
as an opportunity to expand greatly the lawyer's business for both the
good of the public and of the lawyer's pocketbook. In short, he joins
the Cahns in asking the legal profession to abandon its traditional guild
monopoly position73 in favor of more commercial and businesslike mar-
keting procedures. However, the difference between ABA liberals
such as Christensen and the more radical lawyers remains that the ABA
is seeking to reaffirm the internal structure of the profession by adapting
it to the increasing demand for the services of lawyers, while the radi-
cals are disintegrating the profession in pursuit of a better means to
achieve social justice in America.
THE NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
Whatever their ultimate differences in theory, national legal services
proponents and the ABA joined together in 1971 in an effort to resolve
the more immediate political problems of OEO legal services. The
vehicle for preserving the independence of legal services from political
harassment was to be an Independent National Legal Services Corpora-
tion federally funded on the model of the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting. r4 The ABA had been unhappy with OEO's administration
of the legal services program since the regionalization controversy 75
and had conducted studies on alternative positions for a legal services
program within the federal government structure. The Department
of Health, Education and Welfare was rejected because of a possible
conflict of interest in litigation against welfare agencies. The Justice
Department was also considered to be in a conflicting position because
of its obligation to enforce federal statutes which might be challenged
on constitutional grounds by legal services attorneys. The judicial
branch was rejected because of anticipated funding difficulties. The
model of independent executive agencies such as the National Science
Foundation was considered, but rejected as being too dependent upon
the President. 76  The model of the more independent regulatory agen-
72. United Mine Workers v. Ill. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of Trainmen
v. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Chris-
tensen, supra note 12, at 256-84.
73. Civilian Perspective Revisited, supra note 3, at 936.
74. ABA Proposal, supra note 39, at 33-41; Report of Citizens Advocates Center,
reprinted in 1971 OEO Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 5, at 1707-49.
75. Regionalization Hearings, supra note 32, pt. 2, at 140-69.
76. ABA Proposal, supra note 39, at 19-41, 59-80.
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cies was not considered applicable.7" The idea of an independent na-
tional corporation for administering the funding of the national legal
services program had also been suggested by the President's Advisory
Commission of Executive Organization.78 It was the Commission's
report and the prospect of a Presidential proposal that provided the im-
petus for action in the 92nd Congress on the creation of a National
Legal Services Corporation.7 9
Throughout the National Legal Services Corporation controversy,
legal services proponents leaned on the ABA in a desperate attempt
to preserve their existence as a federally funded entity. They found a
common ground in the traditional duty of a lawyer to represent his
client zealously without interference from outside sources, as set forth
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.80 In some respects the
ethics issue is unreal because the Code of Professional Responsibility is
not binding on Congress or on any individual attorney unless adopted by
the state in which he is licensed and practices.81 However, it provided
a conservative argument for legal services' continued independence of
action against its conservative political opponents in Congress who con-
tinued to propose numerous restrictions on its activities.
The Congressional controversy over the National Legal Services
Corporation consisted of two basic arguments; the composition of the
board of directors of the Corporation, and the imposition of limitations
on Corporation and grantee activities. The board of directors contro-
versy was responsible for the demise of the first two sets of National
Legal Services Corporation bills.
In March of 1971, a bipartisan coalition in Congress introduced
parallel National Legal Services Corporation bills in the House and the
Senate."2 The object of these bills was to forestall an expected proposal
from the President which was expected to be considerably more conserv-
ative. The bipartisan bill provided for an incorporating trusteeship
made up of members of the ABA, the National Legal Aid and Defender
77. ABA Proposal, supra note 39, at 59.
78. U.S. President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, supra note
39, at 6.
79. H.R. REP. No. 93-247, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973).
80. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs No. 7; Ethical Considerations 7-1, 5-23;
Disciplinary Rule 5-107(b); ABA Proposal, supra note 39, at 13-17.
81. WISE, LEGAL ETHics, ix (2nd ed. 1970). The state's general power to regu-
late the practice of law was not invalidated by NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-39
(1963). This regulation is commonly done by statute, court nile, state bar association
or a combination of the above.
82. H.R. 6360 and S. 1305, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Economic Opportunity
Act, Hearings Before Special Hearing Subcomm. No. 2, House Comm. on Education &
Labor, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES
Association (NLADA), the Association of American Law Schools and
the National Bar Association. Once the Corporation was in operation,
the permanent board of directors was to consist of one-third representa-
tives from the above-mentioned organizations, one-third public mem-
bers appointed by the President, and one-third representatives of legal
services attorneys and clients.83 It was anticipated that legal services
clients could be represented by an organization known as the National
Clients Council. 4 This was obviously the bill supported by legal services
proponents and the ABA.
In early May, the President presented his proposal in the form
of another set of parallel National Legal Services Corporation bills intro-
duced in the House and the Senate.8" The administration bill did not
include the incorporating trusteeship and provided that all the members
of the board of directors of the Corporation be appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate.86
After extensive hearings, the bipartisan bill was incorporated into
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1971 (S. 2009) which passed both
houses of Congress only to be vetoed by the President in December of
1971. In his veto message, the President stated that the National Legal
Services Corporation provisions were, after the child development pro-
gram, the primary source of his objections to S. 2009. He cited the
weakness of the National Legal Services Corporation provisions as the
control of the Corporation by "various professional, client and special
interest groups, some of which are actual or potential grantees of the
Corporation."87' In other words whereas the ABA hoped to keep the
Corporation independent of the Executive branch by insuring that "out-
side" organizations dominate the board of directors, the President wanted
to keep control over the Corporation through his exclusive power to
appoint directors.
S. 2009 did not survive the Presidential veto, and the 2nd Ses-
sion of the 92nd Congress went on to consider a substitute bill, H.R.
12350. In its original form, H.R. 12350 contained another National
Legal Services Corporation provision in title ix.8 8  This time the board
83. Id.
84. 1971 OEO Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 4, at 1664-67.
85. Providing Legal Services to Americans, President's Message to Congress, 7
Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 727 (May 5, 1971); H.R. 8163 and S. 1769, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); Economic Opportunity Act, supra note 82, at 30.
86. H.R. 8163 and S. 1769, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Economic Opportunity
Act, supra note 82, at 30.
87. The President's Message to the Senate Returning S. 2007 Without His Ap-
proval, 7 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 1634 (Dec. 9, 1971).
88. S. REP. 92-987, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).
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of the Corporation was to consist of a majority (10 out of 19) of pub-
lic members appointed by the President, one member representing each
of the above-listed interest groups, and two members each represnt-
ing the legal services attorneys and the National Clients Council. How-
ever, while H.R. 12350 was in the last stages of a Senate and House
conference committee, the President informed the committee that he
would veto the new bill unless he was given the authority to appoint
all the directors of the National Legal Services Corporation. 9 When
the Senate and House conferences could not agree whether to meet the
President's demands, it was decided to drop the Corporation in favor
of continuing the legal services program without any change in structure
so as not to jeopardize the other OEO provisions of H.R. 12350.90
The 93rd Congress saw a new crop of National Legal Services
Corporation bills.9 ' By this time the need for congressional action
had become more urgent as a result of OEO Director Howard Philips'
efforts at "dismantling", which left the legal services program without
a director and on a 30-day at a time funding arrangement.9 2 The new
House bills were eventually abandoned in favor of H.R. 7824 which
provides for eleven members of the Corporation board of directors,
six of whom must be attorneys, to be appointed by the President with
the advise and consent of the Senate.93 The incorporating trusteeship
has been abandoned and the transition period is to be supervised by
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.94 In short, all the
President's objections have been met.95 H.R. 7824 passed the House
on June 21, 1973. In the meantime, however, the ABA dropped its
support of the bill because of certain amendments made on the floor of
the House.9 To understand these amendments we must take up the
second basic National Legal Services Corporation argument, the im-
position of limitations on Corporation and grantee activities.
The limitations argument is really an attempt on the part of the
same politicians who attacked the legal services program under OEO
to disable the Corporation from the start so as to prevent it from con-
89. 118 CONG. REC. S. 14077, H. 8058-59 (1972).
90. Id.; see Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-424, 86 Stat.
690 (1972).
91. H.R. 3147, H.R. 3175, H.R. 3409; see Establishment of a Legal Services
Corporation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House
Comm. on Education & Labor, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
92. ld. at 24-25, 34.
93. H.R. RaP. No. 93-247, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
94. Id. at 14-15.
95. Id. at 2.
96. 59 A.B.A.J. 987 (1973); 119 CONG. Rac. H. 5067-138 (1973).
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tinuing to support law reform activity. In other words, the new Cor-
poration which was designed by the ABA to insure independence for the
national legal services program, and restructured by the President to
insure Executive control over its operations can be further amended by
Congress in such a way as to make it inoperable.
The Congressional limitations began with the 1971 administration
bills which prohibited the National Legal Services Corporation from
representing criminals and engaging in legislative lobbying.9 7  The
ban on representing criminals was aimed at avoiding the duplication of
services provided by federal and local public defender programs. It is
considered by legal services people to hinder the establishment of full-
services neighborhood law offices and the servicing of clients involved
in boycotts, strikes and injunctions. The anti-lobbying restriction con-
fines legal services to the test cases type of judicial legislation which
has raised so many problems in the past. However, both of these
restrictions are present in some form in the OEO legal services pro-
gram and do not represent a significant change in the status quo. More
controversial is a requirement that appellate work be screened for "effi-
cient use of resources," seemingly a direct attack on law reform liti-
gation. Another issue is the requirement that no funds be granted
to "public interest" law firms. This argument revolves around the
definition of a "public interest" firm and an inconsistent provision for
funding non-public interest private firms. Opponents of the limitation
have argued that the administration is actually going to turn the Cor-
poration into a Judicare program without any provision for law reform
activities. 98  The most serious "public interest" controversies have not
been concerned with "public interest" litigation, which many legal serv-
ices proponents disapprove of, anyway, as a waste of legal resources. 99
The greater threat is the effect of the provision on the funding of legal
services "back-up centers" or research facilities supplying poverty law
materials to OEO funded neighborhood offices.100
Another set of controversial limitations was directed at the per-
sonal lives and activities of the legal services attorneys. These restric-
tions are intended to prevent direct action on the part of legal services
97. 1971 OEO Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 4, at 1567-71; Testimony of Jean
Camper Cahn, 1971 OEO Amendments, supra note 40, pt. 5, at 1646-76.
98. 1971 OEO Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 4, at 1568-71.
99. Power to the People, supra note 48, at 1005-06. See Marks, supra note 69,
for discussion of "public interest" law firms. This issue was resolved in H.R. REP. No.
93-247, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (June 4, 1973); but see 119 CONG. REc. H. 5132 (June
21, 1973).
100. Testimony of Jean Camper Cahn, 1971 OEO Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 5,
at 1647-76.
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attorneys in boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and illegal activities. It
should be noted that in this context, illegal activities is meant to en-
compass the violation of court injunctions. These restrictions were
backed up by requirements that procedures be established by the Cor-
poration for disciplining grantee employees who violate them.10 1 Al-
though this type of restrictions has been repeatedly attacked as a viola-
tion of first amendment rights,0 2 a recent decision upholding the Hatch
Act (restricting political activities on the part of federal civil service
employees)' 03 seems to indicate that they would not automatically be
overruled on constitutional grounds.
Numerous other restrictions were proposed by each new National
Legal Services Corporation bill until, by the 93rd Congress, the issue
'had become whether Congress should be allowed to restrict totally
the methods of litigation such as appeals, test cases, class actions, group
representation, and suits against government agencies with a view to
eliminating national legal services' law reform activity. It was at this
point that both legal services proponents and the ABA invoked
the "integrity of the lawyer-client relationship" as set forth in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. In the short run the ethics argument
proved persuasive. The President believed it.'04 The House returned
H.R. 7824 from committee with only moderate restrictions limited by
section 6 (b) (3), which provided that
the corporation shall not interfere with any attorney in carrying
out his professional responsibility to his client as established in
the Canons of Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility of
the American Bar Association . ... 105
However, on the floor of the House the political opponents of na-
tional legal services rallied and amended H.R. 7824 to limit drastically
(1) the range of problems which the corporation grantees could handle,
(2) the types of people who could be represented, (3) the means which
grantee attorneys could use, and (4) the structure and longevity of the
Corporation itself. First, restrictions were imposed on litigation in-
volving non-therapeutic abortions. Litigation in regard to school de-
segregation, higher educational desegregation and military amnesty
was prohibited. Second, the Corporation was barred from providing
legal assistance to "unemployed persons who refuse to seek or accept
101. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-247, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 6-8 (1973).
102. Testimony of Jean Camper Cahn, 1971 OEO Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 5,
at 1647-76.
103. U.S. Civil Service Comm. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880
(1973) reversing 346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972).
104. Providing Legal Services to Americans, supra note 85.
105. 119 CONG. REc. H. 5094, col. 2 (June 21, 1973).
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employment", and indigent Watergate defendants. Third, an amend-
ment was made prohibiting the funding of any activities relating to ballot
measures such as initiatives or referendums, which excluded the na-
tional legal services program under the Corporation from any issues
that become political. Further, the anti-lobbying provision was strength-
ened to prohibit use of corporation funds to
directly or indirectly .. .influence any executive order or simi-
lar promulgation of any Federal, State, or local agency, or . ..
influence the passage or defeat of legislation by the Congress of
the United States, or by any State or local legislative bodies ...106
except upon formal invitation of the agency or legislative body. Al-
though an exception was made to allow some representation before ad-
ministrative bodies in individual cases, it is not clear that this amend-
ment would not have the effect of totally prohibiting activities aimed
at changing administrative determinations or forcing administrative com-
pliance with constitutional and statutory provisions. 10 7 To put it more
directly, this amendment appears to be a sophisticated attempt to incor-
porate the First Murphy Amendment banning suits against government
agencies and officials. Whatever the effect on administrative advoc-
acy, the absolute ban on involvement in political issues and direct and
indirect legislative activities is sufficient to put -the Corporation in viola-
tion of Disciplinary Rule 7-101 (A) (1) and Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility."°8 More importantly, it prohibits the
Corporation from representing the poor in their area of greatest legal
difficulty--dealing with local, state and federal governments.
Fourth, the ban on funds to "public interest" firms was extended
to any law firm which spent 50% of its time in the "public interest", and
funding to back-up research centers was prohibited. Finally, the Cor-
poration is to liquidate automatically on June 30, 1978. If enacted
into law in its present form, one wonders if the National Legal Services
Corporation will last that long or become so bogged down in inter-
preting all the restrictions in its enacting statute that it becomes non-
functional anyway.
CONCLUSION
After the amended bill passed the House, the President of the
ABA issued a statement denouncing it.' 9 H.R. 7824 is presently
106. 119 CONG. REC. H. 5115, col. 3 (June 21, 1973).
107. 119 CoNG. REC. H. 5115-19 (June 21, 1973).
108. See 119 CONG. REc. H. 5117 (June 21, 1973).
109. 59 A.B.A.J. 987 (1973).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
awaiting further action by a Congress preoccupied with difficulties in the
Office of the President and the "energy crisis.""'  It appears that be-
tween the President's insistance on Executive control and Congress' re-
strictions on law reform activities, the entire purpose of the National
Legal Services Corporation (i.e. to insure the independence of the
national legal services program) has been thwarted.
The outlook for national legal services is presently rather bleak.
The ABA has turned its attention to the field of prepaid legal services"'
leaving the neighborhood law office supporters to fend for themselves.
It is too early to say just how the spiralling demand for legal services is
going to be dealt with. The ABA seems to be counting on prepaid legal
service insurance and group plans based on current programs for the
payment of medical and hospitalization expenses" 2 to meet the demand
problem with minimal disruption to the legal profession's monopoly
and internal structure. In a sense they may come out ahead of the
medical profession because of the decision of most law schools to ex-
pand enrollments in the face of the increased number of applicants for
admission in recent years, rather than to increase competition. Relatively
open access to professional education will help to keep the rising de-
mand for lawyers a "delivery of services" problem rather than a lawyer
shortage problem.
The "Rights" and "Grievances Explosion" is another matter. Radi-
cal lawyers are already gravitating into political and "public interest"
arrangements in violation of both the traditional law firm structure and
the classic attorney-client relationship. At the same time, they are
channeling a vast quantity of political, social, economic and aesthetic
problems into the courts. How much litigation the court system can
'continue to absorb before it too begins to disintegrate remains to be seen.
However, if the activities of the radicals do disintegrate or transform
the judicial system, no "delivery of services" plan, no matter how effec-
tive, is going to reaffirm either the traditional structure of the prac-
ticing bar or its monopoly over the administration of law and justice.
110. See 120 CONG. REC. S909-1012 for the Senate version of H.R. 7824 passed
Jan. 31, 1974. As of publication, a common bill has yet to be enacted.
111. 59 A.B.A.J. 987-88 (1973).
112. Id.
